In May 2025, the General Court of the European Union (GCEU) delivered its judgment following an appeal made by Schmidt Spiele GmbH (Schmidt Spiele).
The appeal challenged a decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), which rejected Schmidt Spiele’s opposition to the trademark filed by former Manchester United goalkeeper, David de Gea Quintana’s (David de Gea).
Our Intellectual Property Lawyers explore the case below.
Background
In September 2021, David de Gea applied with the EUIPO to register a figurative EU trademark consisting of the letters ‘D’, ‘D’, and ‘G’ (the DDG Mark). The mark was to cover goods including ‘Games and playthings; Video game apparatus; Gymnastic and sporting articles; Decorations for Christmas trees’.
In October 2021, Schmidt Spiele a German games manufacturer, filed a notice of opposition citing its own earlier registered EU trademark containing the sequence ‘D’, ‘O’, and ‘G’ (the DOG Mark).
The DOG Mark covered goods including those described as ‘Games (including electronic and video games), other than those adapted for use with an external display screen or monitor; playing cards; board games; party games; all the above except toys for animals’.
In April 2023, the EUIPO’s Opposition Division rejected the opposition.
Schmidt Spiele appealed this decision, but the Board of Appeal subsequently dismissed the appeal on the basis that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks.
Schmidt Spiele then brought the matter before the GCEU, seeking annulment of the prior decisions and requesting that the EUIPO be ordered to pay the costs.
The legal principles
Schmidt Spiele based its claim on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and argued that the Board of Appeal were incorrect in finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the DDG Mark and DOG Mark. Article 8(1)(b) provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trademark applied for shall not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected.
The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trademark.
A likelihood of confusion includes the risk that the public may believe the specific goods originate from the same or economically linked undertakings.
This must be globally assessed, in line with the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods, and considering all factors relevant to the case’s circumstances, especially that of the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the covered goods.
Assessment of the Likelihood of Confusion
Relevant public
In the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, there ought to be consideration as to the average consumer of the category of goods, as well as the notion that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services.
Schmidt Spiele argued the Board of Appeal ought to have deemed there to be a lower level of attention as games and toys, including board games, are inexpensive and purchased daily.
However, the GCEU upheld the Board’s finding that the level of attention would be average, given the nature of the goods.
Comparison of the Signs
Schmidt Spiele tried to argue that a consumer would view David de Gea’s sign as it is, without analysing the graphic representation of each letter of the sign in detail, and that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that it was unlikely the second letter would be perceived as the letter ‘o’ instead of the letter ‘d’.
However, the GCEU found that the Board were correct in their view that the presence of the letter ‘g’ would mean that it is likely the first two characters would be perceived as the letter ‘d’.
Ultimately, the Board was deemed correct in finding that the vast majority of the relevant public would perceive the sequence of letters ‘d’, ‘d’ and ‘g’.
Distinctiveness
Further, the assessment of the likelihood of confusion must consider the distinct and dominant elements of the signs as the perception of a mark by an average consumer plays a crucial role in determining likelihood of confusion.
The Court reiterated the importance of assessing the distinctiveness and dominance of elements within each mark. The DDG Mark was considered distinctive as it had no inherent meaning for the public.
By contrast, the DOG Mark was found to have a recognisable and meaningful word element, which could reduce the visual and phonetic similarities between the two signs. The word ‘dog’ was deemed distinctive and dominant in the earlier mark.
Visual
Visually, the marks were found to have only a low degree of similarity due to the difference in the central letter (‘D’ in DDG vs ‘O’ in DOG).
Phonetically, the Board determined that both marks would likely be pronounced as individual letters rather than as words, leading to low phonetic similarity. Conceptually, the DDG Mark held no meaning, whereas the DOG Mark evoked the clear and familiar concept of a dog, making a conceptual comparison impossible.
Decision of the GCEU
Ultimately, the GCEU dismissed Schmidt Spiele’s appeal, holding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the DDG and DOG Marks.
The Court found the DOG Mark to possess average distinctiveness and agreed with the EUIPO’s conclusion that the marks differed visually, phonetically, and conceptually.
The judgment not only upholds the validity of David de Gea’s trademark application but also underscores the importance of how the relevant public perceives the signs when assessing the likelihood of confusion.
It serves as a reminder that opposition proceedings must be carefully evaluated in light of the distinctiveness, dominant elements, and overall impression of the marks involved.
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